The post-Cold-War transformation of Central and Eastern Europe involved a complex reconfiguration of existing collective identifications, territorial attachments and borders, 
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Introduction
As several works published over the course of the past few decades have demonstrated, virtually all of the European societies have a centuries-long record of constructing Europe as a spatial and socio-cultural entity starkly opposed to those parts of the world which are conceived as non-European or at least not sufficiently European: the Orient, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans etc. (Said 1978; Wolff 1994; Delanty 1995 Delanty , 1996 Lewis and Wigen 1997; Todorova 1997) . While the majority of these studies focussed almost exclusively on the ways Western European authors imagine the Balkans and the East, some scholars have pointed to the fact that these symbolic geographies are far from being an exclusively Western European product. Instead, they are often (re-)produced locally, within the despised regions themselves, whose inhabitants tend to internalise the categories applied to them by their Western observers, or use them to distinguish themselves from inhabitants of neighbouring states (Gal 1991; Bakić-Hayden and Hayden 1992, Norris 1999; Iordanova 2001; Bjelić and Savić 2002; Patterson 2003; Kuus 2004; Lindstrom and Rasza 2004 ).
Yet unlike the old EU member states such as Germany, Britain and Denmark, which seem to be propelled towards Europe mainly via a number of negations (Hedetoft 1995: 527-581) , and to which Europe offers only "an indirect avenue towards national identity confirmation" (579), the Central and Eastern European states are characterized by a much more affective, positive involvement with European issues. For states such as Hungary, Poland or Slovenia, belonging to Europe was, years before actually joining the EU, a crucial positive element of national identification. The transformation following the collapse of the Cold War arrangement of the world was often framed as a journey 'back to Europe', and joining the EU symbolised the ultimate station of this journey (Henderson 1999) . Each of the nations presented itself as fundamentally European; a long-lost child of Europe who, after decades of Soviet or Yugoslav domination, was finally re-joining the 'common home' of Europe.
This marked emphasis on belonging to Europe is hardly surprising. Unlike the Northern, Southern and Western borders of Europe, which follow the coastline and are thus fairly unambiguous, the Eastern and Southeastern borders are notorious for their malleability and multiplicity (Connor 1994 (Connor [1969 ; Wolff 1994; Lewis and Wigen 1997; Todorova 1997) . Due to that, in regions positioned to the East and Southeast of Europe, belonging to Europe is not necessarily an obvious choice. Over the course of time, these regions have often been seen as cleaving to other spatial units, for example Asia or the Balkans.
Thus, the assertion of belonging to Europe should not be seen simply as a description of the real position of these countries, but rather as a wishful projection that was itself involved in shifting the borders of Europe eastwards and southwards. Or, to put it differently, the East and Central European countries and nations were in fact stretching the external borders of Europe to include themselves (Mihelj 2004b) , thereby also delineating themselves from their immediate neighbours whom they perceived as not sufficiently European. Therefore, the postCold-War transformation of Central and Eastern Europe involved a complex reconfiguration of existing collective identifications, territorial attachments and borders, which included both establishing new attachments and borders and dispensing with the old ones.
This article traces this reconfiguration by looking at a specific case, namely the case of Slovenia -the only part of the former Yugoslav federation that joined the EU in 2004. It starts by discussing the conceptualisation of borders, focussing in particular on the relationships between symbolic and institutionalised borders, and arguing that a full examination of bordermaking mechanisms should take into account not only the discursive construction of collective identity and borders and the actual functioning of the state frontiers, but also the various citizenship and immigration laws, related policy measures and discourses which justify them. After briefly sketching the transformation of symbolic attachments and borders during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the article analyses the appropriations of this new symbolic mapping in the public debates and immigration and citizenship policies related to the two major instances of immigration in Slovenia after the establishment of an independent Slovenian state in 1991: the arrival of Bosnian war refugees in 1992, and the increase in Refugees-Illegal Foreigners) produced by the first TV channel (TVS1) of the public broadcasting service Radio-Television Slovenia.
Persona non grata,
The analysis presented in the paper is, for the most part, limited to the examination of manifest uses of symbolic geography appearing in the media coverage.
3 The first step involved a search for all the occurrences of nouns and adjectives referring to geographical regions and territories (e.g. Europe, European, the South, Southern etc.) and other words based on such geographical categories (e.g. the Southerners). Then followed the identification of all those cases where these nouns, adjectives and other words referring to geographical regions and territories were associated with specific characteristics and values (e.g. violence/ peacefulness, democracy/ dictatorship, rate of development etc.). Particular attention was paid to the similarities with various types of discourses involving symbolic geographies, especially the discourse of Balkanism (Todorova 1997 ) and the discourse of Frontier Orientalism (Gingrich 1998) . Finally, the main part of the analysis involved an examination of how these words were used to frame the relationship between refugees and undocumented immigrants on the one hand and Slovenia and Slovenians on the other hand. This involved raising questions such as: Were the refugees and immigrants seen as equally European or Western as Slovenians? How was Slovenia's link with Europe used to justify the introduction of particular policy measures related to refugees and undocumented immigration?
Symbolic and Institutionalised Borders
The construction of the Other and the closely related creation of borders are widely acknowledged and explored aspects of national identity formation and of the construction of other forms of collective identity (Barthes 1969; Cohen 1985) . It has also been recognized that the borders of the national Self are often enshrined in laws and institutionalised in the form of state borders. Borders between states can therefore be seen not merely as physical, empirical lines that appear on maps; they are also "social, cultural and political constructs that are made meaningful and exploited by human beings as part of the institutionalization processes of territories" (Paasi 2004: 22) . Or, as Malcolm Anderson (1996: 2) argued: state frontiers should not be regarded only as institutions, but also as "markers of identity", that form a "part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of the people, and sometimes myths about the 'natural' unity of a territory".
Symbolic borders of particular communities, however, are institutionalised not only in the form of state frontiers, but also in the form of citizenship and immigration laws. This is hardly surprising. Within the classical model of the state, the state territory is assumed to be congruent with a territorially bounded population (see e.g. Bendix 1964 ). The state thus needs to be treated not only as a territorial organisation, but also as a membership organisation, i.e.
an association of citizens (Brubaker 1992: 22 It could be argued that together, the state borders and laws regulating citizenship and immigration, serve to perpetuate and reify a specific "sedentarist metaphysics" (Malkki (Mihelj 2004b (Cohen 1998: 33 destruction of this neutralising framework, however, these categories were re-evaluated and began to be perceived as opposites rather than simply differences, which "has resulted in the destruction of the living communities that transcended them".
In this process, 'Europe' began to be used as a symbol of civilisation and development. Most politicians, intellectuals and journalists would claim Slovenia to be more civilised, developed and progressive-and thus more European-than the rest of Yugoslavia. According to the foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel, for example, Slovenians were actually a major factor in the Europeanization of the Yugoslav state (Delo, 18/12/1990) . Such a symbolic positioning of Slovenia was also used to justify the claim for independent statehood. To secure and protect its higher level of development and civilisation, it was argued, Slovenia should embark on the process of further Europeanization as a fully sovereign nation-state.
By contrast, the prospect of Slovenia remaining an integral part of Yugoslavia was repeatedly pictured as detrimental to Slovenia's prosperity. The president of the Slovenian Assembly
France Bučar, for example, argued that the failure to achieve full independence would actually mean a "Yugoslavisation of Slovenia", and that "with that, the right road we have taken in our republic would be blocked" (Daily News Bulletin, TV Slovenia 1, 16/11/1990).
The Slovenian Christian Democrats were even more explicit; as they argued in their appeal to the public launched shortly before the plebiscite for an independent Slovenia in 1990, the Slovenian government "could only stop the intrusion of the Balkan violence into our lands, and the ever-more greedy robbing of our hard-earned financial means, by taking the matters into its own hands, as dictated by the interests of Slovenia as an independent unit" (Delo, 11/12/1990). The common Yugoslav space came to be equated with underdevelopment, barbarism, disorder, decay and violence, thus assuming the characteristics usually ascribed to the Balkans or Eastern Europe (Wolff 1994; Todorova 1997) .
The New Symbolic Mapping of Slovenia as a Frame for the Issue of Immigration
The symbolic mapping of Slovenia as developed, progressive and 'European', and the rest of Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communist regimes, undocumented immigration, predominantly originating in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, has been one of the major issues on the political agendas in many European societies.
Among other things, the immigrants have become targets of a new kind of moral panic (Husbands 1994) ; they have been charged with abusing the welfare state, committing crimes and 'stealing' jobs from established citizens (Koser and Lutz 1998: 3) . Perceived in such a way, immigrants have easily become objects of nationalist and racist hatred (Stolcke 1995; Tesfahuney 1998) , and have regularly been used as a negative screen to crystallise a positive self-identity of receiving societies (cf. Cohen 1994 and Croatia or other former co-citizens seeking refuge in Slovenia could only lead to a "Balkanisation of our country". "The South" -another geographical term often used as a tool for the exclusion of the non-Slovenians -is, in his view, characterised by "mental, political, behavioural, family or sexual patterns" that are clearly distinct from those in Slovenia, and if anyone is attracted by them, "he should move out and let the Slovenians tailor their our own future".
The use of such pompous mapping of Slovenia and Slovenians was, however, neither limited to the far-right segment of the political spectrum nor to the right wing or tabloid newspapers.
A similarly unambiguous framing of Bosnian refugees as 'Balkan' could be found, for example, in an article published in the major, most widely read Slovenian broadsheet newspaper, Delo (11/07/1992). Like the above-mentioned letter, also this article had a title that clearly indicated the presence of the Balkanist frame, namely In the Embrace of the Balkans. Furthermore, it was replete with negative representations of refugees, explicitly presenting them as potential criminals.
Institutionalisation of the Border between Europe and the Balkans
The representations of Bosnian refugees such as the ones presented above are remarkably similar to the representations of the Balkans that were first formed by Western European writers in the late 19 th century, and permeated much of Western political commentary of the post-Cold-War developments in the region. As Maria Todorova (1997) argued, the Balkans tended to be represented as "an incomplete self" or "the structurally despised alter-ego" (18).
They "served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self- (2003: 199-200) has argued, the classification of all Bosnian refugees as 'temporary' fostered the treatment of the refugees as a homogeneous group, and precluded a differentiated treatment that would be sensitive to the specific circumstances of individual cases. Most importantly, the definition of refugees as 'temporary' was also used as an excuse to introduce a number of measures evidently in contradiction with the standards defined in the international agreements on human rights.
Firstly, the Bosnian refugees were denied the right of free movement. They had to solicit a permit to leave the refugee centre, and in some centres, each refugee was limited to only two or three such permits per week. Although such an arrangement was a clear violation of refugee's rights as defined in international charters, it was consistently represented by the state officials dealing with the refugees and by most of the journalists as something normal.
Even more, the fact that the refugees were usually granted permission to exit the centres whenever they asked was presented as something positive, as a demonstration of the 'good will' of the Slovenians (Doupona Horvat et al. 2000 Horvat et al. [1996 : 32). Moreover, such attitudes regularly went hand in hand with the expressions of deep sympathy for refugees' suffering.
For example, Damirka Batinić, a journalist of TV Slovenia, was very sympathetic to the suffering of the refugees who complained about their life in the centres, and even compared it to life in prison (Refugees Here with Us, TVS1, 30 Aug 1992). However, the views of refugees were introduced only after an opinion of an expert who argued that the temporary status was, in part, a consequence of the refugees' own wish to return to Bosnia as soon as possible. Based on this, Batinić interpreted the complaints of the refugees as a consequence of a misunderstanding, and argued: "All these misunderstandings and unrealistic demands by the refugees would not have arisen had somebody explained their status to them at the beginning". Obviously, in Batinić's eyes, nothing was intrinsically wrong with the definition of refugees as 'temporary'.
Secondly, the refugees were not allowed to work. The introduction of this measure was usually justified by reference to the high rate of unemployment in Slovenia. Yet rather than being thought of as a drawback, the prohibition was occasionally represented as a privilege.
For example, Ante Livić, another journalist working for TV Slovenia, compared the situation in Slovenia with the condition in Austria, where the refugees "had to work". He argued that this might be one of the explanations of the fact that the refugees preferred to stay in Slovenia rather than go to Austria (cf. Daily News Bulletin, TVS1, 18/05/1992). Such an argument clearly supported the stereotype of refugees as lazy and entirely different from the diligent Slovenians.
Finally, Slovenia also introduced educational segregation. The refugee children were not allowed to attend classes together with Slovenian children in regular Slovenian schools.
Instead, special education was provided for them in their mother tongue. Just as the restriction of the free movement and the prohibition of work, this measure has also been represented as perfectly normal. Since the refugees would sooner or later return to Bosnia, went the argument, it was necessary to prepare them for reintegration, thus to preserve their national and cultural identity while in Slovenia (Doupona Horvat et al. 2001 Horvat et al. [1996 : 32-36). By such a twist of argument, even the segregated system of education was presented as a privilege, as yet another confirmation of Slovenia's high democratic standards.
In sum, all the policy measures discussed above contributed, first and foremost, to the physical isolation of refugees from the host society. Taken into account their association with the Balkans on the level of representations, these measures also prevented the mixing of the two poles of the Slovenian imagined geography that were thought to be incompatible: the Balkans on the one hand and Europe on the other. Therefore, they can be seen as particular institutionalisations of the symbolic border that separates Slovenia and Slovenians, as a part of Europe, from Bosnians, as a part of the Balkans.
Closing the Borders as a Way of Protecting Europeanness
Another aspect of public debates that involved symbolic geography focused on who had responsibility for helping the refugees. After the representative of the UNHCR expressed the wish that Slovenia would keep on treating refugees as a regional issue, several journalists, politicians and other publicly known persons in Slovenia protested. 
Case Study II: Undocumented Immigration from the Middle and Far East
Contrary to the arrival of Bosnian war refugees, the sudden increase in undocumented Europe, but rather as a transit-area at Europe's margins, clearly differentiated from the 'real' Europe/ the West, i.e. the EU. As one of Delo's journalists put it: "For the majority of foreigners, our country is only a springboard for the departure towards the West rather than a destination country where they could live a decent life," (27/07/2000). And fourthly, besides being represented as a transit area, Slovenia was also consistently portrayed as a state that is bound to protect Europe/ the West from the 'assaults' of immigrants coming from 'the East'.
This was clearly apparent from the choice of metaphors used to describe the country's role in relation to the immigration and Europe. For example, Slovenia was described as "a hall of Europe, a security belt and a border gendarme" (Delo Sobotna priloga, 10/06/2000), a "migratory sieve for Europe" (Demokracija, 05/10/2000) and as "the last barrier before the West" (Nedelo, 28/05/2000).
Institutionalisation of Frontier Orientalism
Such symbolic positioning was not entirely new. Quite to the contrary, it was very similar to the one that could be found in the discourse of "Frontier Orientalism" (Gingrich 1998 
'Fortress Europe' -an Excuse for the Introduction of Restrictive Policy Measures
The willing acceptance of the role of the 'border gendarme' of Europe, however, did not last open letter published in several Slovenian newspapers, the members of a non-governmental organisation, the Office for Interventions, claimed that the EU "has reserved for Slovenia the role of a sanitary cordon which should protect Europe from the throng of contemporary barbarians from the deprivileged world". Obviously, argued the members of the Office, the state decided to solve the problem by instigating xenophobia, which would lead to the unification of 'us' against 'them' and would finally make it easier to blame 'them' for the government's own incapability to solve the problems. Even this, however, suspected the members of the Office, might be a strategy which Slovenia had learned from the EU: "Has, perhaps, the Ministry for European Affairs brought this strategy from the training programmes organised for them by the European Union (EU), meant as help with the introduction of the Schengen standards on state borders here? Is spreading xenophobia inwards and grovelling before Brussels' bureaucracy a recipe for solving the current state of affairs?" (Dnevnik, 19/12/2000) .
Evidently, the members of the Office maintained that the actor responsible for the situation in Slovenia was, first and foremost, the EU -and the Slovenian authorities, as long as they blindly followed its instructions. Again, the main party to blame was not Slovenia or the Slovenian population itself, but the EU. Curiously, hardly anyone involved in the public discussion pointed out that the EU member states, however restrictive their policies may be, still accepted far more asylum seekers than Slovenia did (one such exception could be found in Nedelo, 09/02/2001).
Conclusions
The process of European integration and enlargement has fundamentally transformed the functioning of state borders between the member states, and had strong reverberations for the symbolic borders involved in the construction of collective identities. The internal borders of the EU have lost most of their traditional functions and become notoriously porous. The national identifications and borders, while still firmly in place, have become intertwined with attachments to the supra-national collective of Europeans. However, this weakening of borders within has gone hand in hand with a strengthening of external borders, and a drive to separate Europe and the Europeans from territories and populations perceived as not belonging to Europe.
Predictably, this aspect of European integration has been most visible in member-states positioned on the margins of the EU. The transformation of borders, symbolic geographies and collective attachments in Slovenia examined in the paper is a case in point. Over the past twenty years, its northern and western borders, initially treated as a parts of the Iron Curtain, haves been transformed first into a regular international border and then into one of the internal EU borders. Simultaneously, its southern border went from being an entirely porous, purely administrative internal border linking Slovenia with the fraternal Yugoslav republic of
Croatia to functioning as a fully fledged international border and finally to being the external border of the EU. A parallel transformation has occurred at the level of symbolic geography:
Slovenia was no longer seen as being a part of Yugoslavia, belonging neither to the West nor to the East, but was now positioned as a part of Europe/ the West, clearly distinct from territories beyond its southern and eastern borders. Finally, the attachment to a wider collective of South Slavs or Yugoslavs has been dropped and replaced by an attachment to the collective of Europeans.
Besides providing an insight into these transformations, and particularly into the appropriations of the symbolic borders of Europe, the paper aimed to raise a more general point related to the study of borders. Since the state is not only a territorial organisation, but also a membership organisation, the institutional regulation of, and meanings attached to state borders are closely intertwined with the institutional regulation of, and meanings attached to citizenship and immigration. Due to that, state borders are far from being the sole institutional vehicle of the symbolic borders separating the Self from its Others. Policy measures regulating immigration function as an additional vehicle for these borders, and thus provide a complement to the institution of state borders: if the state border marks the perceived territorial borders of the Self, the immigration-related policy measures serve to maintain the perceived population borders distinguishing the Self from its Other(s).
As demonstrated through the analysis of mass media representations of two major instances of immigration in Slovenia since 1990, the public framing of immigration was underpinned by assumptions closely corresponding with the symbolic positioning of Slovenia and the collective identifications of Slovenians as established with the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
The immigrants were not perceived only as a threat to the national homogeneity of Slovenians, but also as threat for Slovenia's attachment to Europe. These assumptions were used to frame a number of policy measures designed to regulate immigration. Particularly the adoption of restrictive policy measures, including the prohibition of the free movement, the tightening of border controls, and even the closing of borders for immigration was largely legitimised by reference to Slovenia's position vis-à-vis Europe. In the case of Bosnian war refugees in 1992, the fear of being lumped together with other formerly Yugoslav republics rather than being regarded as an equal member of Europe was so strong that it drew the political elites to support closing the borders for the refugees when it appeared that other 
